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Tempestuous municipal debt markets: Oxymoron or new reality? 
by Gene Amromin, senior fi  nancial economist, and Anna Paulson, vice president and director of fi  nancial research
Municipal bonds (munis) are issued by states, cities, or other local government agencies. 
They may be general obligations of the issuer or secured by specified revenues, like fees 
paid by tollway users. The interest on municipal bonds is usually exempt from federal in-
come taxes. Investors have long regarded these bonds as a relatively safe investment. 
Not coincidentally, holdings of municipal securities (or munis) have been heavily concen-
trated among household investors, who own about two-thirds of the $2.9 trillion market.1
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In the fall of 2010, the sense of compla-
cency that had surrounded these invest-
ments was shaken by deteriorating fi  scal 
conditions of state and local bond issuers. 
The concerns about 
issuers’ ability to 
honor their existing 
debts were amplifi  ed 
by high-profi  le media 
interviews that, for the 
fi  rst time, raised the 
specter of “hundreds 
of billions of dollars 
in defaults.”2 Investors 
headed for the exits 
en masse. In just fi  ve 
weeks, a record $16.5 
billion was withdrawn 
from muni mutual 
funds. By late January 
of this year, the yields 
on the highest-rated 
(AAA) issues of 20-
year municipal debt 
had jumped by nearly 
100 basis points 
(fi  gure 1) and new 
bond issuance had slowed to a trickle. 
In recent months, municipal bond mar-
kets have calmed considerably. Still, this 
episode provides a number of useful 
insights into their structure, as well as 
highlighting some of their potential fault 
lines. In this Chicago Fed Letter, we describe 
how municipal markets are responding 
to changing conditions and new inves-
tor concerns.3
What happens when local governments 
go bankrupt?
This, in essence, was the question asked 
by retail and professional investors alike 
in the wake of dramatic statements about 
the impending tide of state and muni-
cipal issuer defaults. Within days, the pop-
ular and fi  nancial press carried numerous 
stories on this subject. In late January, 
the U.S. Senate reportedly considered 
introducing legislation to allow states 
to declare bankruptcy. This action only 
increased investor unease as bankruptcy 
is not typically an option for sovereign 
borrowers like states. The states, in turn, 
registered their strong opposition to 
this legislative idea, for fear of further 
undermining investor confi  dence.4
The bankruptcy process for municipal-
ities is governed by Chapter 9 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code, which allows local 
governments to voluntarily seek bank-
ruptcy protection in the federal courts.5 
However, since municipalities are instru-
mentalities of states that retain certain 
sovereign rights under the Tenth Amend-
ment, their eligibility for Chapter 9 
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SOURCE: Municipal Market Advisors, median AAA general obligation yields data, 
available at www.mma-research.com. 
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SOURCE: The map is based on data from H. Slayton Dabney, Jr., Patrick Darby, Daniel G. Egan, Marc A. Levinson, and 
George B. South III, 2010, Municipalities in Peril: The ABI Guide to Chapter 9, American Bankruptcy Institute: Alexandria VA.
protection is controlled exclusively 
by each state. Presently, Chapter 9 
fi  lings are either prohibited or not 
expressly permitted in 26 states (see 
fi  gure 2). Many of the remaining states 
further restrict eligibility by requiring 
explicit authorization by various elected 
or appointed bodies. For instance, 
Louisiana requires the governor and 
the attorney general to pre-approve 
a bankruptcy petition, while in New 
Jersey such approval must be granted 
by a municipal fi  nance commission.
Chapter 9 fi  lings are also substantially 
different from the more familiar corpo-
rate bankruptcy proceedings. The mu-
nicipality cannot be forced to declare 
bankruptcy by its creditors. While the 
municipality is able to restructure its 
contracts, its assets cannot be liquidated. 
Furthermore, only the municipality, 
and not its creditors, can propose an 
exit plan. The bankruptcy court has very 
limited authority to force any specifi  c 
restructuring changes. In fact, unlike 
with corporate bankruptcies, the court 
for the most part is a passive observer 
of the Chapter 9 process. After the ini-
tial determination of eligibility to fi  le 
is made, the main remaining function 
of the court is to confi  rm an exit plan.
Municipal bankruptcies do not generally 
result in any losses for bond investors. In 
each of the approximately 300 Chapter 9 
fi  lings over the past 40 years, bond inves-
tors were repaid in full, if sometimes late. 
In some cases, the payments were made 
not by the issuers but by fi  nancial institu-
tions that had provided letters of credit 
or bond insurance. An important reason 
why municipal bondholders are typically 
repaid even when a local government de-
faults is that debt service costs are usually 
small, averaging just over 4% of revenue 
fl  ows. In addition, many municipal bonds 
are backed by dedicated revenue sourc-
es, such as toll roads or sewer systems. 
These sources are considered secured 
assets in bankruptcy, severely limiting 
issuers’ ability to divert their cash fl  ows 
away from repaying bondholders. While 
municipalities do have the ability to stop 
interest payments on general obligation 
(unsecured) bonds, doing so provides 
a relatively small savings at a very high 
cost. A municipality that has defaulted 
on its debt will face a signifi  cant hurdle 
in raising capital in the future. 
Responding to investors’ concerns
Municipal bond issuers responded to 
investor concerns primarily by launch-
ing an intensive educational campaign 
intended to clarify the extent of investor 
protections munis offer. These efforts 
were aimed not just at individual inves-
tors, but also at lawmakers and institu-
tional money managers.
Not surprisingly, given their broad powers 
over municipal issuers, the states took 
the lead in this effort. Some states clari-
fi  ed their stance on municipal defaults. 
For instance, Michigan passed a law en-
abling the state to intervene earlier in 
fi  nancially stressed municipalities and 
to grant additional restructuring powers 
to state-appointed emergency managers 
in an effort to avoid Chapter 9 fi  lings. 
Other states toughened existing bank-
ruptcy laws. For example, Rhode Island’s 
legislature passed a law requiring munici-
palities to guarantee lenders fi  rst rights 
to property tax and general revenues in 
the event of a bankruptcy. The states and 
their advocates also successfully lobbied 
Congress to drop its effort to expand 
Chapter 9. 
Institutional money managers renewed 
their interest in munis, helping to absorb 
the excess supply of bonds from mutual 
fund redemptions. As muni investors 
digested the new information, the mar-
ket calmed down, with yields declining 
to early 2010 levels and issuance bounc-
ing back in June (see fi  gure 1). 
Understanding muni market risk
Experience in the municipal markets in 
recent months shows how even a tempo-
rary loss of investor confi  dence can disrupt 
state and local governments’ access to 
fi  nancing. It also highlights a specifi  c 
channel for transmitting risk between 
municipalities and their fi  nancial 
intermediaries.
A sizable share of long-term municipal 
debt is funded in variable-rate markets 
with daily or weekly interest rate resets. 
A common contract feature of these 
variable-rate debt obligations (VRDOs) 
is that investors have the right to return 
the obligation to the issuer with short 
advance notice. In other words, an in-
vestor can refuse to roll over a VRDO 
at any given reset date and demand that 
the issuer buy it back. This clearly pres-
ents a signifi  cant rollover risk for the VRDO 
issuer that is mitigated by obtaining 
external liquidity support.6 In practice, 
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such support typically takes the form of 
a liquidity facility provided by a bank. 
Issuers with lower credit ratings often 
combine such a facility with an insurance 
wrapper in the form of a letter of credit. 
Under the terms of such facilities, ex-
isting bondholders that refuse to roll over 
a VRDO get paid back in full by new in-
vestors or, if the bank is unable to sell 
the bonds to new investors, by the bank 
itself. In the event that a VRDO cannot 
be rolled over or sold to new investors, 
it automatically converts into a bank-
owned bond that accrues interest at a 
signifi  cantly higher penalty rate and that 
amortizes on an accelerated schedule, 
typically over two to fi  ve years—a very 
costly development for the issuer.
Historically, variable-rate obligations 
accounted for about 14% of all new 
municipal debt issuance.7 At the height 
of the fi  nancial crisis in 2008, as other 
sources of variable-rate fi  nancing dried 
up, VRDO issuance shot up to more than 
30% of all new municipal debt. Although 
variable-rate issuance has slowed down 
dramatically since then, there was about 
$380 billion in VRDOs outstanding at 
the end of the fi  rst quarter of 2011.8
Do VRDOs pose a material risk to banks 
providing liquidity support? Although sev-
eral dozen fi  nancial institutions currently 
provide liquidity facilities for VRDOs, the 
market is rather heavily concentrated, 
with the top fi  ve providers accounting 
for nearly 50% of support.9 Nearly all 
of these banks, however, are large, well-
diversifi  ed fi  nancial institutions. The pro-
posed Basel III liquidity framework will 
likely result in higher provisioning for po-
tential draws on liquidity facilities, limit-
ing their availability and leading to higher 
prices. In particular, in computing the 
liquidity coverage ratio, a bank will have 
to assume a net cash outfl  ow of 100% 
of its VRDO commitment, but may at 
best be able to count only a fraction of 
the resulting bank-owned bonds as high-
quality liquid assets. Put differently, 
VRDO facilities (especially those support-
ing lower-rated issues) will deplete the 
bank liquidity coverage ratio. 
The composition of liquidity providers 
has changed markedly over the past few 
years. At the peak of VRDO issuance, 
the market had attracted a number of 
specialized lenders willing to extend 
support at very aggressive prices. Many 
of these lenders were based in Europe 
and their expansion into the U.S. mu-
nicipal market was rather rapid. By some 
estimates, by the fall of 2008, lenders 
like Depfa, Dexia, Allied Irish, and var-
ious German landesbanken (state-owned 
banks) accounted for about $90 billion 
in liquidity support. Most of these fi  nan-
cial institutions have been winding down 
their facilities at a brisk pace, so that by 
the fi  rst quarter of 2011 their commit-
ments had fallen by about one-third. 
This has been especially true for institu-
tions that found themselves in fi  nancial 
distress.10 Their market share has largely 
been absorbed by the large U.S. banks.
VRDO risk cocktail 
In addition to rollover risk, reliance on 
VRDOs exposed state and local issuers to 
a bevy of risks more typically encountered 
by sophisticated fi  nancial institutions. 
Like those institutions, municipalities 
have had to reevaluate their ability to 
manage these risks during the fi  nancial 
crisis and its aftermath.
The most obvious of these risks stems 
from fl  uctuations in interest rates, which 
may increase substantially over the life 
of a variable-rate loan. A traditional way 
of managing this risk has been through 
interest rate swaps, where a VRDO issuer 
agrees to receive variable-rate payments 
from a bank counterparty in exchange 
for making fi  xed-interest-rate payments 
itself. The swap agreement protects the 
issuer from an unexpected rise in inter-
est rates. Of course, the fl  ip side of this 
arrangement is that issuers incur sub-
stantial costs if interest rates decline 
unexpectedly. 
The second risk comes from the maturity 
mismatch between the bond obligation it-
self and the liquidity agreements that sup-
port it. Variable-rate municipal bonds 
typically have maturities between ten and 
30 years, but their underlying liquidity fa-
cilities seldom extend beyond three years. 
Consequently, VRDO issuers take on the 
risk of failing to renew their facilities or 
having to do so at higher rates because of 
general market conditions (e.g., different 
competitive environment) or issuer-spe-
cifi  c concerns (e.g., lower credit ratings). 
The fi  nal and, perhaps, least appreciated 
type of risk is counterparty risk. Counter-
party risk refl  ects the concern that the 
liquidity provider will either not be able 
to honor its obligations or, more likely, 
that the liquidity provider experiences 
fi  nancial distress that in turn impacts the 
issuer’s borrowing costs. Counterparty 
risk can exacerbate other risks for the 
issuer. For example, a distressed bank 
may not be a credible source of liquidi-
ty and this could lead bondholders to 
refuse to roll over VRDOs or to demand 
higher interest rates.
Recent experience in managing 
these risks 
Many municipal issuers managed their 
interest rate exposure through swaps. 
Since interest rates have declined sub-
stantially over the past several years, these 
arrangements ended up losing money 
for the issuers. In several extreme cases, 
payments on swaps-related transactions 
were big enough to create solvency 
problems.11
Most of the liquidity facilities associated 
with the wave of VRDO issuance in 2008 
are coming up for renewal. The result-
ing renewal risk has generated numer-
ous headlines, given the sheer size of renewing facilities and the exit of Euro-
pean banks from the market. The early 
results, however, have been reassuring. 
According to a recent Moody’s report, 
nearly all of the existing facilities have 
been renewed, albeit at somewhat higher 
prices.12 On the other hand, the ability 
of issuers to refi  nance their VRDOs in 
the fi  xed rate market has been some-
what curtailed by their past use of inter-
est rate swaps. Since the issuers are 
deeply underwater on their swaps, their 
counterparties are not willing to let them 
out of the arrangements without substan-
tial cancellation fees. Keeping the swap 
and refi  nancing into a fi  xed term bond 
would make even less fi  nancial sense. An 
alternative solution to address renewal 
risk is to replace VRDOs with fl  oating-
rate notes that are remarketed every 
three years. Their interest rates still 
reset monthly, so they can serve as the 
reference contract for existing swaps. 
The ongoing reshuffl  ing of VRDO li-
quidity provision toward larger, well-
diversifi  ed fi  nancial institutions has 
lessened the counterparty risk somewhat. 
Still, we have recently had a potent re-
minder of how important such risks still 
are. The Greek debt crisis spurred down-
grades in the credit outlook for some 
European banks with large direct expo-
sure to Greece. Some of these banks, like 
Dexia, also happen to provide liquidity 
facilities to U.S. municipal issuers. Thus, 
when VRDOs backed by Dexia came 
due for repricing in June 2011, inves-
tors demanded sharply higher rates of 
return. In some cases, they refused to re-
price altogether, causing Dexia to take 
back the VRDOs, convert them to bank-
owned bonds, and reset loan terms to the 
issuers. Some small U.S. towns and mu-
nicipal agencies thus ended up bearing 
some of the costs of the European sov-
ereign debt crisis, without ever having 
participated directly in those markets.
Conclusion
Municipal markets have been buffeted 
by concerns about issuer quality, investor 
protection, reliance on short-term fund-
ing sources, and exposure to unstable 
liquidity guarantors. Various market par-
ticipants have responded to address these 
fears in a number of ways, whether by 
clarifying existing arrangements, modify-
ing them, or developing new ways to mit-
igate risks. Although the long-term fi  scal 
condition of municipal issuers remains 
a concern, they have largely managed to 
retain their ability to access capital mar-
kets, refl  ecting a recovery of investor 
confi  dence in assessing and pricing the 
risks associated with these investments. 
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